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TORTS-PARENT -CHILD IMMUNITY: PARENT -CHILD
TORT IMMUNITY DEFENSE IS APPLICABLE IN
WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL ACTIONS DESPITE
THE MODERN TREND TOWARD ABROGATION OF THE
DOCTRINE. Smith v. Gross, 319 Md. 138, 571 A.2d 1219
(1990).

INTRODUCTION

I.

In the last several decades there has been a substantial erosion
of the parent-child immunity doctrine, which allows a parent to
escape liability for torts committed against a child. l This erosion has
come in the form of exceptions to the doctrine in cases where courts
have recognized that application of the immunity would not serve
the policies behind the doctrine. 2
In Smith v. Gross,3 however, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
reaffirmed its commitment to the parental immunity doctrine. The
court in Smith held that neither a wrongful death action nor a
survival action could be maintained against a defendant who could
have used the immunity defense against the decedent had the decedent
lived. 4 Although this decision is consistent with Maryland precedent,
it runs counter to the modern trend of abrogating the rule in cases
where the policy underlying the rule cannot be furthered. 5
II.

BACKGROUND

At English common law a child was considered to be a separate
legal person from his or her parents. 6 As such, a child was entitled
;. See Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 561, 568-87, 505 A.2d 826, 836, 840-49 (1986).
2. See Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 13 (Alaska 1967) (immunity doctrine will not

3.
4.

5.
6.

bar a motor tort action because liability insurance negates the concern for
family harmony); Attwood v. Estate of Attwood, 276 Ark. 230, 238, 633
S.W.2d 366, 370 (1982) (immunity doctrine will not bar an action for injuries
caused by willful and wanton conduct); Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, 200 Conn. 290,
291, 512 A.2d 130, 133 (1986) (immunity doctrine will not bar an action for
injury sustained by minor at father's work site). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 895G comments d - i (1979).
319 Md. 138, 571 A.2d 1219 (1990).
Id. at 149, 571 A.2d at 1224.
See, e.g., Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 8950 comments d - i (1979); 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES &
O. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8.11 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter HARPER).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8950 comment b (1979); W. PROSSER
& W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, at 904 (5th ed. 1984).
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to own property and enter into contracts. 7 The child could bring suit
against all others, including his or her parents, regarding these
property and contract rights. 8 A child could also maintain a criminal
action against a parent if the parent acted unreasonably in disciplining
the child. 9 Although it is unclear whether a child could maintain a
personal tort action against a parent, there are no decisions indicating
that such an action would not lie, subject only to the parent's privilege
to reasonably discipline the child. IO
In 1891, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held in Hewlett v.
George ll that a minor child could not maintain a personal tort action
against a parent. 12 In Hewlett, a daughter alleged that her mother
had willfully and maliciously imprisoned her in an insane asylum so
her mother could obtain her property. The court in Hewlett fashioned
the parent-child immunity doctrine on the principle that permitting
the suit would disrupt the family peace. 13 The court reasoned that
the state's criminal laws would provide the daughter with adequate
protection. 14
Even though the court in Hewlett cited no supporting authority,
many courts adopted the parent-child immunity doctrine in both
intentional and negligent tort actions. IS Numerous courts adopted the
doctrine based on the theory that family unity and tranquility must

7. HARPER, supra note 5; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 6. See generally,
Akers & Drummond, Tort Actions Between Members of the Family - Husband
& Wife - Parent & Child, 26 Mo. L. REV. 152 (1961).
8. See Young v. Wiley, 183 Ind. 449, 107 N.E. 278 (1914); Clark v. Smith, 13
S.c. 585 (1879).
9. See Neal v. State, 54 Ga. 281 (1874); Hinkle v. State, 127 Ind. 490, 26 N.E.
777 (1891).
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G comment b (1979); HARPER;
McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 VILL. L. REV. 521, 527 (1960).
11. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
12. [d. at 705, 9 So. at 887.
13. The Hewlett court reasoned:
[Sjo long as the parent is under obligation to care for, guide, and
control, and the child is under reciprocal obligation to aid and comfort
and obey, no such action as this can be maintained. The peace of
society ... [deniesj the minor child a right to appear in court in the
assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at
the hands of the parent.
[d. at 705, 9 So. at 887.
14. Hewlett, 68 Miss. 703, 704, 9 So. 885, 887 (1891).
15. See, e.g., Materese v. Materese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925) (no action
permitted where a child is injured while a passenger in automobile negligently
operated by parent); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664
(1903) (no action permitted when minor child is beaten by parents); Roller v.
Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905) (civil action precluded against· father
convicted of raping daughter).
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be preserved. 16 Others reasoned that parents must be allowed a certain
measure of discretion in the discipline and care of their children. 17
Still others determined that a family's financial resources must be
protected from the disproportionate enrichment of the plaintiff family
member. 18
In 1930, Maryland adopted the parent-child immunity doctrine
in Schneider v. Schneider,19 holding that a parent could not sue a
minor child for injuries resulting from the child's negligent driving. 20
The court in Schneider reasoned that a parent could not simultaneously stand in the roles of adversary and guardian. 21 The court stated,
"A right of action at law is not one open to any and all persons
against any others, without reference to relationships which may exist
between them. "22
In 1971, in Latz v. LatZ,23 the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland, bound by the Schneider decision, held that parental immunity applied to bar a plaintiff-parent from maintaining a wrongful
death action against a minor child. 24 In Latz, a parent was killed
while a passenger in an automobile negligently driven by her unemancipated, minor daughter. While noting the trend of abrogating
the parent-child immunity doctrine, the court chose to leave such
abrogation in Maryland to the legislature. 25
In Frye v. Frye,26 the Court of Appeals of Maryland reaffirmed
its commitment to the parental immunity rule with respect to motor
torts.27 In Frye, a child was injured by his father's negligent driving.
In dismissing the child's tort action, the court of appeals stressed
the policies of fostering family harmony and supporting parental
authority.28 The court also stated that because statutory public policies
16. See, e.g., McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S. W. 664. See generally Annotation,
Liability of Parent for Injury to Unemancipated Child Caused by Parent's
Negligence, Modern Cases, 6 A.L.R.3d 1066 (1981).
17. See, e.g., Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938), rev'd, 369
Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907 (1975).
18. See, e.g., Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923).
19. 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930).
20. Id. at 22-23, 152 A. at 499.
21. /d.

22.Id.
23. 10 Md. App. 720, 272 A.2d 435, cert. denied, 261 Md. 726 (1971).
24. Id. at 725, 272 A.2d 438.
25. Id. at 734, 272 A.2d 442-43.
26. 305 Md. 542, 505 A.2d 826 (1986).
27. The court in Frye distinguished its recent abrogation of interspousal immunity
in Boblitz v. Boblitz, 269 Md. 242, 462 A. 2d 506 (1983) from parent-child
immunity. The court of appeals stated that the two immunities are distinguishable in that they are based on separate policies and have different legal histories.
Frye, 305 Md. at 557-58, 505 A.2d at 834.
28. Frye, 305 Md. at 557-58, 567, 505 A.2d at 834, 839.
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concerning compulsory liability insurance laws and family unity would
be affected by abrogation of the parent-child immunity doctrine, the
legislature, not the judiciary, should effect the abrogation. 29
Commentators, however, have sharply criticized the parent-child
immunity rule. 30 One criticism is that the justifications for the rule
do not outweigh the importance of compensating the injured person. 31
Other critics argue that it is absurd to believe that an uncompensated
tort makes for family peace and tranquility. 32 Finally, some critics
argue that the scope of the immunity doctrine is too broad, and
should be replaced with a narrower parental privilege applying only
to those actions growing directly out of the family relationship.33
Responding to the potentially unjust results of the immunity
doctrine, many courts created exceptions to the doctrine in cases
where the underlying policies could not be furthered by its application. Thus, courts allowed suits between parents and emancipated
children. 34 Similarly, exceptions were made where the parent and

29. Id. at 567, 505 A.2d at 839.
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G (1979); HARPER, supra note 5,
at 574-81; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 6, at 905-06. See generally
Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50
FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 496-508 (1982) (critically analyzing the rationales in
support of the parent-child immunity doctrine).
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G comment c (1979). As the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine stated:
The strong trend against the across-the-board application of a
rule of parental immunity in tort cases reflects a growing recognition that such a sweeping application results in excessive
protection of the interests favored by the rule in derogation of
the general principle that there should be no wrong without a
remedy.
Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634, 635 (Me. 1979).
32. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 905.
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8950 comment j (1979); see also
Framm, Parent-Child Tort Immunity: Time For Maryland to Abrogate an
Anachronism, 11 U. BALT. L. REV. 435, 466 (1982).
A growing minority of jurisdictions have completely abrogated the parentchild immunity doctrine, replacing it with more flexible rules revolving around
parental privilege. Many abrogating courts reasoned that it is the injury itself,
not the suit, that disrupts family life. The Wisconsin Supreme Court took the
lead in abrogating the immunity doctrine in Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402,
122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). The Goller court held that no immunity existed except
in situations incident to the parental role. Id. at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198. In
Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971), the
California Supreme Court abrogated the immunity rule and held that the
standard should be that of a reasonable and prudent parent. Gibson, 3 Cal.
3d at 921, 479 P.2d at 653,92 Cal. Rptr. at 293. Accord Anderson v. Stream,
295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980).
34. See, e.g., Waltzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107, 128 A.2d 617 (1956). The court
of appeals reasoned that the need for parental discretion was absent due to
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child stood in a business relationship and the Injury arose out of
that relationship.3s Courts reasoned that the parent was not acting
in a parental role at the time of the injury, and therefore, should
not be entitled to use the parent-child immunity defense. 36 Numerous
courts abrogated the immunity with respect to automobile accidentsY
Others permitted wrongful death and survival actions, reasoning that
because the parent-child relationship was terminated by death the
policy of upholding the unity of that relationship was inapplicable. 38
In Mahnke v. Moore,39 the Court of Appeals of Maryland carved
out an exception to the immunity rule for "injuries resulting from
cruel and inhuman treatment or for malicious and wanton wrongs."4O
In Mahnke, a young girl was forced to watch her father murder her
mother, spend a week with the corpse, and then watch her father
commit suicide. The court in Mahnke held that the father had
abandoned his parental obligation and destroyed the family unity by
his conduct, thereby forfeiting his right to use the immunity defense. 41

35.

36.
37.

38.

39.
40.
41.

the child's majority. [d. at 126, 128 A.2d at 627.
There are five methods by which a child may become emancipated: (1) by
written or oral agreement or by some act the parent relinquishes control; (2)
the parent abandons, neglects, or is cruel to the child; (3) the child enters into
a valid marriage; (4) the child reaches the statutory age of majority; and (5)
the child enlists in the military. Note, Right of Action of a Minor Child
Against a Parent Tort Feasor, 12 MD. L. REv. 202, 211 (1951).
See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); see also Hatzinicolas
v. Protopapas, 314 Md. 340, 550 A.2d 947 (1988) (parent-child immunity will
not bar a child's recovery in negligence from a parent's business partner, where
the partnership was responsible for an injury and partner is entitled to contribution from the parent partner).
See Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (1971); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va.
17, 19, 166 S.E. 538, 539 (1932).
See Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907 (1975) (immunity is
abrogated to the extent of parent's automobile liability insurance); Smith v.
Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971) (high incidence of vehicle
liability insurance has made parent-child immunity anachronistic as applied to
automobile accident litigation); Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669 (Del. 1976)
(parent-child immunity does not apply to the extent of automobile liability
insurance). But see Schneider v. Coe, 402 A.2d 682 (Del. 1979) (immunity is
applicable where duty arises from family relationship notwithstanding existence
of insurance).
See Harlan Nat'l Bank v. Gross, 346 S.W.2d 482 (Ky. 1961) (wrongful death
action based on alleged negligent driving permitted because policy behind
immunity rule is inapplicable due to death of child). Accord Johnson v. Myers,
2 Ill. App. 3d 844, 277 N.E.2d 778 (1972); Plumley v. Klein, 31 Mich. App.
26,187 N.W.2d 250 (1971), aff'd, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972); Palcsey
v. Tepper, 71 N.J. Super. 294, 176 A.2d 818 (1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 895G comment g (1977).
197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).
[d. at 68, 77 A.2d at 926.
[d. The court stated:
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The court of appeals emphasized that it was making an exception to
the parent-child immunity rule because the policies underlying the
rule could not be served by its application.
In addition to the exception for outrageous intentional torts,
Maryland has also abrogated the parent-child immunity doctrine for
emancipated children. In Waltzinger v. Birsner,42 a parent was injured
while riding in an automobile operated in an allegedly negligent
manner by her emancipated adult son. In allowing the action, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland reasoned that the need for parental
discretion was absent because of the child's majority.43
Despite these exceptions, Maryland has refused to follow the
modern trend of abrogating the rule with respect to negligence cases,
and especially automobile accident cases. Instead, Maryland continues
to cling to the seminal case of Schneider by applying the parentchild immunity doctrine to .negligent automobile accident cases. In
Smith v. Gross,44 the Court of Appeals of Maryland applied this
archaic doctrine to a case where alleged negligence resulted in the
death of a child.
III.

FACTS

In Smith, two-year-old Roland Randolph Gross, Jr. was killed
in an automobile accident, allegedly resulting from his natural father's
negligent driving. 4s The child was born out of wedlock to Virginia
Lee Smith and Roland Randolph Gross, Sr. Their son had always
lived with his natural mother, never with his father. 46 The child's
mother, as both the personal representative of the child's estate and
in her individual capacity as mother, brought a wrongful death

[T]here can be no basis for the contention that the daughter's suit
against her father's estate would be contrary to public policy, for the
simple reason that there is no home at all in which discipline and
tranquility are to be preserved ... [w]hen, as in this case, the parent
is guilty of acts which show complete abandonment of the parental
relation, the rule giving him immunity from suit by the child, on the
ground that discipline should be maintained in the home, cannot
logically be applied, for when he is guilty of such acts he forfeits his
parental authority and privileges, including his immunity from suit.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
212 Md. 107, 128 A.2d at 617 (1957).
Id. at 126, 128 A.2d at 627.
319 Md. 138, 571 A.2d 1219 (1990).
Id. at 141, 571 A.2d at 1220.
The court noted that the child's illegitimacy was irrelevant to the decision. The
rule attached in this case because the father was the child's natural father. Id.
at 146 n.5, 571 A.2d at 1222 n.5.
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47
action and a survival action against the father. 49 She claimed
punitive damages in both actions.50 Applying the parent-child immunity rule, the Circuit Court for Dorchester County granted the
father's motion to dismiss the actions for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. 51 The mother appealed, and the
Court of Appeals of Maryland certified the case ex mero motu before
a decision by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. 52
1990]

IV.

REASONING/HOLDING

In wrongful death and survival actions, the general rule is that
defenses which would have been good against the decedent, had the
decedent lived, are also good against the decedent's personal representatives and survivors. 53 The issue presented in Smith was whether
the parental immunity defense is a defense that may be raised by
operation of this general rule. 54 In affirming the circuit court's
dismissal, the court of appeals held that the parental immunity
defense may be raised in such actions, thereby precluding the mother
from proceeding against the father both in her own right as a parent
and as the personal representative of the child's estate. 55 Consistent
with Maryland precedent,56 the court stated that parental immunity
bars all negligence actions, and specifically those· actions involving
motor tortsY In upholding the parent-child immunity doctrine, the
court of appeals emphasized the importance of protecting the family
integrity and supporting parental discretion in the discipline and care
of the child. 58
The court acknowledged that its continued refusal to abrogate
the parent-child immunity rule for motor torts is inconsistent with

47. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN., §§ 3-901 to 3-904 (1989). "Wrongful

act" is defined as "an act, neglect, or default including a felonious act which
would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages
if death had not ensued." Id. at § 3-901(e).
48. See MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 7-401(x) (1974).
49. Smith, 319 Md. at 141, 571 A.2d at 1220.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52.Id.
53. Id. at 144-45, 571 A.2d at 1221-22.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 149, 571 A.2d at 1224.
56. Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 505 A.2d 826 (1986); Yost v. Yost, 172 Md. 128,
190 A. 753 (1937) (child cannot sue a parent for non-support; a parent is
generally not liable for passive negligence incident to the parental relation);
Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930).
57. Smith, 319 Md. at 145, 571 A.2d at 1222.
58. Id. at 147-48, 571 A.2d 1222-23.
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the modern trend. 59 In support of its holding, the court cited Frye,
in which it had stated that because the legislature had enacted
compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance laws, and failed to make
an exception to the immunity rule in motor tort cases, the judiciary
should not do so on its own. 60 The court in Frye reasoned that
because insurance laws are part of an elaborate scheme created for
the general welfare and protection of Maryland's citizens, any exception that would affect the· scheme is best left to the legislature. 61
Consistent with this precedent, the Smith court refused to make an
exception to the immunity rule which would impact Maryland's
wrongful death and survival statutes. The court stated that the
General Assembly has had ample opportunity to legislate such an
exception, if that was its intent. 62
Significantly, the court in Smith refused to make an exception
to the immunity rule in a situation where negligence results in the
death of a child. After noting the general rule that defenses which
would have been good against the decedent, had the decedent lived,
are also good against the decedent's personal representatives and
survivors,63 the court found that a parental relationship did exist
between the defendant-father and the child at the time of the accident. 64 The court then reasoned that because the parent-child immunity rule was applicable during the life of the child, the mother's
actions were barred under both the survival and wrongful death
statutes. 65 Without further elaboration the court stated, "The death
of the child did not serve to remove the immunity dictated by the
rule and resurrect the action."66
The court analyzed the relationship of the child and the father,
prior to the child's death, and determined that the father had not
forfeited his rights nor obligations as a parent. 67 This forfeiture test
was used in Mahnke where the court held that the father's estate
was not entitled to use the immunity defense, because the father's
intentional tort against his daughter had led to forfeiture of his
59. Id. at 145, 571 A.2d at 1222.
60. Id. (citing Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 562-67, 505 A.2d 826, 836-39 (1986».
61. Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. at 567, 505 A.2d at 839. But see HARPER, supra note
5, at 574-76 (agreeing with the rationale put forth by courts abrogating
immunity because of the existence of vehicle liability insurance).
62. Smith, 319 Md. at 149, 571 A.2d at 1224.
63. Id. at 144, 571 A.2d at 1221.
64. Id. at 148, 571 A.2d at 1223-24.
65. Id. Wrongful death and survival actions have long been codified in Maryland.
The wrongful death statute was enacted in 1852. Acts of 1852, ch. 299 § 1.
The survival statute was enacted in 1798. Acts of 1798, ch. 101, sub. ch. 8,
§ 5.

66. Id. at 150, 571 A.2d at 1224.
67. Id. at 148, 571 A.2d at 1223.
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parental rights. 68 The court's application of this test in Smith suggests
that it might make an exception to the rule in a negligence action,
if it were shown that the defendant parent had "abandoned the
parental relationship.' '69

v.

ANALYSIS

In Smith, the Court of Appeals of Maryland applied parental
immunity to wrongful death and survival actions. Although the
decision is consistent with precedent70 in negligence actions, it is
inconsistent with the modern trend and view of most commentators. 71
The court should have examined the sound logic behind the modern
trend towards abrogation, and should have held the parent-child
immunity doctrine invalid as applied to wrongful death and survival
actions.
A primary weakness in the court's reasoning in Smith is that it
fails to distinguish between situations where the policy behind the
immunity rule can be furthered by its application, and situations
where no policy can be furthered. For example, in holding the parentchild immunity rule applicable in wrongful death and survival actions,
the court stressed that public policy requires supporting family unity
and protecting parental discretion in the discipline and care of the
child.72 The court failed to explain, however, how the policy will be
served by applying the immunity rule in cases where the parent-child
relationship is terminated by death.
This is the illogical reasoning the dissent questioned. 73 While the
dissent agreed with the majority that under Maryland precedent the
immunity would have applied had the child lived, it argued that the
immunity defense should not be placed in the same category as other
derivative defenses74 in wrongful death or survival actions.7s Using

68. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 68, 77 A.2d 923, 926 (1951).
69. Smith, 319 Md. at 148, 571 A.2d at 1223.
70. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text; see also Montz v. Mendaloff,
40 Md. App. 220, 388 A.2d 568 (1978) (minor child injured when an automobile
was negligently driven by the mother even though the mother's negligence may
have been gross); Sanford v. Sanford, 15 Md. App. 390, 290 A.2d 812 (1972)
(minor child injured when an automobile was negligently driven by father);
Latz v. Latz, 10 Md. App. 720, 272 A.2d 435, cert. denied, 261 Md. 726
(1971) (mother killed while a passenger in an automobile negligently driven by
her minor daughter). But see Montz, 40 Md. App. at 226-29, 388 A.2d at 57173 (Gilbert, C.J., concurring).
71. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
72. Smith, 319 Md. at 146, 571 A.2d at 1222-23.
73. Id. at 150, 571 A.2d at 1224-25 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
74. "Circumstances such as contributory negligence and assumption of risk [and
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the same rationale espoused by many courts and commentators
advocating abrogation in these actions, the dissent reasoned that the
death which led to the action precludes the policy of preserving the
parent-child relationship from being served. 76
The majority interpreted the survival and wrongful death statutes
as permitting only those actions that could have been successfully
maintained by the decedent, had the decedent lived. 77 The majority
arrived at this conclusion by focusing on the phrase, "a personal
action which the decedent might have commenced or prosecuted"78
from the survival statute, and the phrase, "which would have entitled
the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages if death
had not ensued"79 from the wrongful death statute. Read literally,
the language of these statutes seems to bar a wrongful death or
survival action where parental immunity would have prevented the
suit had the decedent lived. Therefore, on its face the majority's
conclusion appears to be valid.
The dissent, however, looked beyond this seemingly valid conclusion to find an error in its logic. The conclusion is illogical because
no policy can be served by application of the immunity rule in this
case. The existing parent-child relationship was severed by the child's
death. The dissent correctly pointed out that this reasoning was
previously used by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in making two
exceptions to the rule. 80 In Mahnke, an outrageous intentional tort
severed the parent-child relationship; in Waltzinger, emancipation
severed the relationship; and in Smith, death severed the relationship.
In all three of these circumstances no policy can be served by
application of the immunity rule.
The dissent further argued that where the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and lack of privity suggests that
there is no cognizable cause of action, the parental immunity defense
means that although there is a cognizable cause of action, the action
will not be permitted because of overriding policy concerns. 81 If the
facts of a case are such that these policy concerns cannot be addressed, as in wrongful death and survival actions, then it is illogical

75.

76.

77.
78.
79.
80.

81.

lack of privity] bar every tort action, regardless of the identity or relationship
of the parties." Id. at 152, 571 A.2d at 1226 (emphasis added).
Id. at 150-53, 571 A.2d at 1224-26. The Smith dissent contends that, "[a]n
immunity such as parent-child immunity, on the other hand, does not mean
that no cause of action exists. It means that a recovery will not be permitted
because of overriding public policy." Id. at 152, 571 A.2d at 1226.
Id. at 154-55, 571 A.2d at 1226-27.
Id. at 143, 571 A.2d at 1221.
/d. at 142, 571 A.2d at 1221 (citing the Maryland survival statute).
Id. at 143, 571 A.2d at 1221 (citing the Maryland wrongful death statute).
Id. at 154, 571 A.2d at 1226 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
Id. at 152-53, 571 A.2d at 1225-26.
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to apply the immunity rule. The statutes, described by the court as
"clear and certain,"82 are certainly flexible enough to allow for a
cause of action where no policy can be served by precluding the
action.
A further weakness in the majority's reasoning is its insistence
that any exception to the immunity rule must be made by the
legislature. 83 This follows Frye where the court refused to make a
motor tort exception, reasoning that such an exception would affect
legislatively created compulsory liability insurance laws. 84 Consistent
with that decision, the court in Smith declined to make an exception
to the immunity which would affect the legislatively created wrongful
death and survival actions.8s The court inferred, from the legislature's
failure to expressly except the immunity in these actions, that the
legislature intends for the immunity to apply in such actions. 86
There are two flaws in the Smith majority's reasoning with
respect to the legislature's inaction. First, the legislature could not
have excluded the immunity rule from application in wrongful death
or survival actions when those statutes were enacted, because they
were enacted long before the Maryland judiciary adopted the immunity rule. 87 In addition, the legislature has never acted to explicitly
amend the statutes to include the immunity rule within the wrongful
death and survival statutes. It may be that the legislature does not
view the immunity defense as applicable in such actions, and therefore, has seen no need to expressly exclude the immunity from them.
This legislative silence leaves the decision squarely with the jUdiciary.
This leads to the majority's second flaw with respect to the
legislature's inaction. As the dissent noted, the parental immunity
rule is a judicial creation, not a legislative one. 88 In addition, the
court has not hesitated to make exceptions to the rule where policy
would not be served by its application. 89 While the circumstances of

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

[d. at 149, 571 A.2d at 1224.
[d.
Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 567, 505 A.2d 826, 839 (1986).
Smith, 319 Md. at 149, 571 A.2d at 1224.
The Smith majority stated: "If the legislature intended that the judicially
created parent-child immunity rule be excepted from the legislatively created
survival and wrongful death action, it has had ample opportunity to say so."
[d. at 149, 571 A.2d at 1224.
87. The Maryland judiciary adopted the parent-child immunity doctrine in Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930), whereas the survival statute
was enacted in 1798, Acts of 1798, ch. 101, subch. 8, § 5, and the wrongful
death statute was enacted in 1852, Acts of 1852, ch. 299, § 1.
88. Smith, 319 Md. at 156, 571 A.2d at 1227 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
89. See Hatzinicolas v. Protopapas, 314 Md. 340, 550 A.2d 947 (1988) (immunity
will not bar child's recovery in negligence from parent's business partner);
Waitzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107, 128 A.2d 617 (1957) (immunity will not
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Mahnke (intentional tort) and Waltzinger (emancipated child) are
different from the circumstances of Smith (death of child resulting
from negligence), the premise used by the court of appeals to make
exceptions to the immunity rule in Mahnke and Waltzinger is just
as valid when applied to Smith. That premise is that the circumstances
of the case are such that the policies behind the immunity rule cannot
be furthered by its application to the case. This same reasoning has
led numerous other courts to take the initiative and except the
immunity in wrongful death actions instead of waiting for their
legislatures to do SO.90
VI.

IMPACT lRAMIFICATION

Nevertheless, the Smith court's application of the parent-child
immunity doctrine to wrongful death and survival actions reinforces
the Maryland judiciary's commitment to the doctrine. Barring action
by the legislature to except immunity in these situations, it appears
that Maryland's erosion of this doctrine ended with Mahnke and
Waftzinger.
The decision in Smith hints at only a single possibility that
judicial exception to immunity will be made in a wrongful death or
survival action. This small window of opportunity appears in the
majority's analysis of the defendant parent's relationship to the child
prior to the child's death. 91 The court suggests that it would make
an exception to the immunity in a wrongful death action if the
defendant parent had forfeited his or her parental rights and obligations. Although not as clear, an exception based on this same
reasoning might also be made in a negligence action where no death
had resulted.
Parental immunity should be viewed as a flexible policy to be
applied only when the policy overrides the importance of compensating the injured person. This is the view that led the Court of

bar recovery by emancipated child); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d
923 (1951) (intentional tort by father against daughter resulted in forfeiture of
parental right to immunity).
The Smith dissent contended:
"In both [Mahnke) and [Waitzinger), where no parent-child relationship
still existed, the Court did not recognize an immunity. In this case, the death
of Gross, Jr. severed the parent-child relationship and terminated the basis for
immunity." Smith, 319 Md. at 154,571 A.2d at 1226 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
90. See, e.g., Barnwell v. Cordle, 438 F .2d 236 (5th Cir. 1971); Brennecke v.
Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960); Dorsey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 9 Ohio St. 3d 27, 457 N.E.2d 1169 (1984).
91. Smith, 319 Md. at 148, 571 A.2d at 1223.
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Appeals of Maryland to make an exception in Mahnke. Had the
court in Smith continued with the reasoning espoused in Mahnke
and Waltzinger, the result in Smith may have been different. As in
these earlier cases, no policy can be furthered by application of
parental immunity in Smith.
92

VII.

CONCLUSION

The decision leaves a wide gap between the law in Maryland
and the modern trend with respect to parental immunity in both
negligence actions, and wrongful death and survival actions. The
court rejected the modern view that even if retention of the rule is
justified by public policy, it should not be extended beyond the
bounds necessary to achieve the policy goals. Instead, the court held
that immunity applies in wrongful death and survival actions, despite
the fact that no policy can be furthered by such application. Therefore, without legislative action, Maryland courts will continue to cling
to the parent-child immunity doctrine.

Sallie M. Brinkley

92. See Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 67, 77 A.2d 923, 925 (1951) (quoting

Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930) with approval). The court
in Dunlap stated the following view of the parental immunity rule:
On its face, the rule is a harsh one. It denies protection to the weak
upon the ground that in this relation the administration of justice has
been committed to the strong and that authority must be maintained.
It should not be tolerated at all except for very strong reasons; and
it should never be extended beyond the bounds compelled by those
reasons.
[d. at 909.

